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DISAPPOINTMENT AVERSION AND SOCIAL COMPARISONS IN A
REAL-EFFORT COMPETITION
SIMON GÄCHTER, LINGBO HUANG and MARTIN SEFTON∗
We present an experiment to investigate the source of disappointment aversion in
a sequential real-effort competition. Specifically, we study the contribution of social
comparison effects to the disappointment aversion previously identified in a two-
person real-effort competition (Gill, D., and V. Prowse. “A Structural Analysis of
Disappointment Aversion in a Real Effort Competition.” American Economic Review,
102, 2012, 469–503). To do this we compare “social” and “asocial” versions of the
Gill and Prowse experiment, where the latter treatment removes the scope for social
comparisons. If disappointment aversion simply reflects an asymmetric evaluation of
losses and gains we would expect it to survive in our asocial treatment. Alternatively, if
losing to or winning against another person affects the evaluation of losses/gains, as we
show would be theoretically the case under asymmetric inequality aversion, we would
expect treatment differences. We find behavior in social and asocial treatments to be
similar, suggesting that social comparisons have little impact in this setting. Unlike in
Gill and Prowse we do not find evidence of disappointment aversion. (JEL C91, D12,
D81, D84)
I. INTRODUCTION
An important research program in behavioral
economics has been the development of theories
of reference-dependent preferences according
to which people are loss averse—weighing
losses more heavily than gains—around an
expectations-based reference point. Such theo-
ries (e.g., Bell 1985; Delquié and Cillo 2006;
Köszegi and Rabin 2006; Loomes and Sugden
1986) were originally developed and tested in
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nonstrategic settings (e.g., individual lottery
choice experiments), but they have obvious
relevance to contests, which quite naturally
result in winners and losers, gains and losses.1
In this study, we examine the behavioral conse-
quences of competing against Nature or against
another person. The reason this may matter is
that competing against a person invites social
comparisons that are not relevant in games
against Nature.
Our framework for studying social compari-
son effects in a contest is the two-person sequen-
tial real effort competition studied by Gill and
Prowse (2012) (hereafter GP). In their model,
they show that a disappointment averse second
mover (i.e., a second mover who is loss averse
around an expectations-based reference point)
responds negatively to a first mover’s effort, and
in their experiment they find significant evidence
for this discouragement effect.
1. See Gill and Stone (2010) for an analysis of endoge-
nous expectations-based reference points to a competitive
setting.
ABBREVIATIONS
GP: Gill and Prowse (2012)
MSM: Method of Simulated Moments
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On the basis of existing evidence on the impor-
tance of social comparisons and by formally
modeling inequality aversion, we hypothesize
that disappointment aversion is likely to be dif-
ferent when competing against another person
compared to competing against Nature. To test
this hypothesis, we conduct an experiment with
two treatments. The SOCIAL treatment features a
game between two human subjects playing in the
roles of first and second mover, exactly as in the
study by GP. The ASOCIAL treatment removes
the scope for social comparisons by removing
the first mover. Instead the second mover plays
against Nature in a decision problem that, absent
social comparison effects, corresponds to the sec-
ond mover’s decision problem in the SOCIAL
treatment. Thus, if social comparisons do not
affect behavior we expect behavior in the two
treatments to be similar, whereas social compari-
son effects may lead to differences.
Our main result is that, contrary to our
hypothesis, behavior is very similar across our
treatments. This is the case whether we compare
average efforts or examine the data at a more
disaggregated level using regression analysis.
Two other unexpected findings of our study are
that we find much weaker prize effects than
GP and, unlike them, we find no evidence for
disappointment aversion.
The remainder of our paper is organized as
follows. Section II introduces the GP framework.
Section III discusses the literature that motivated
our main hypothesis. Section IV presents the
design of our study, and Section V the results.
Section VI presents a discussion and conclusions.
II. DISAPPOINTMENT AVERSION IN THE GP
FRAMEWORK
GP applied an expectations-based version of
a disappointment aversion model to a real-effort
competition. In their setting, a first mover and
a second mover compete for a single prize by
sequentially exerting efforts, with each player’s
chance of winning the prize being a probabilistic
function of both efforts. Specifically, the second
mover wins a money prize, v, with probability
P = (e2 –e1 + γ)∕(2γ)
where e1 and e2 represent first mover and second
mover effort, respectively, and γ= 50 in their (and
our) experiment.
In GP’s model, the second mover’s utility is
separable in the utility derived from monetary
earnings and the disutility associated with effort.
In their linearized model, the second mover’s util-
ity from monetary earnings in the event that she
wins the prize is assumed to be v+ g2(v− vP),
where v is the “material utility” of the prize, g2
is a preference parameter, and g2(v− vP) is the
“gain-loss utility” associated with earning more
than expected. Utility from monetary earnings
in the event that the second mover fails to win
the prize is given by 0+ l2(0− vP), where 0 is
the material utility, l2 is a preference parame-
ter, and l2(0− vP) is the gain-loss utility associ-
ated with earning less than expected. A second
mover is defined as being disappointment averse
if λ2 ≡ l2 − g2 is strictly positive, that is, if she is
loss averse around her expected monetary payoff.
Letting C2(e2) denote the second mover’s effort
cost, the second mover’s expected utility is
EU2
(
e1, e2
)
= P
(
v + g2 (v − vP)
)
(1)
+ (1 − P)
(
0 + l2 (0 − vP)
)
− C2
(
e2
)
= vP + λ2vP (1 − P) − C2
(
e2
)
.
GP assume that the second mover maximizes
Equation (1), taking e1 as given. They show that if
λ2 = 0 the optimal effort, e∗2, is independent of e1,
but if the second mover is disappointment averse,
λ2 > 0, then e∗2 is always (weakly) decreasing in
e1. Assuming a quadratic effort cost function,
C2
(
e2
)
= be2 + ce22∕2,
and a strictly concave objective function, GP
show that (Proposition 3, p. 480):
de∗2∕de1 = −λ2v∕(2γ
2c − λ2v) < 0.
Thus, there is a discouragement effect that
becomes stronger if the second mover is more
disappointment averse or if the prize is higher.
The GP experiment, which we replicate and
describe in more detail below, uses a real effort
task in which subjects position sliders on a screen.
Effort is measured by the number of correctly
positioned sliders. GP find significant evidence
for a discouragement effect (i.e., e∗2 is decreas-
ing in e1), which is more pronounced the higher
the prize. Using structural estimation to estimate
the distribution of λ2, they find significant het-
erogeneity across individuals and a significantly
positive mean of λ2.
The starting point for our study is based on
the observation that the GP model is silent about
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the role of the first mover as a source of disap-
pointment aversion. Suppose that the material
utility of winning simply depends on the amount
won, and the asymmetric weighting of gains
and losses is akin to the loss aversion exhibited
in many studies of individual decision making
under uncertainty, where the gain-loss utility
reflects the elation/disappointment of getting
more/less money than expected. Under this inter-
pretation it would not matter whether the second
mover chooses e2 to maximize Equation (1) after
observing the effort choice of a first mover, or
whether there is no first mover and the second
mover chooses e2 to maximize Equation (1)
where e1 is an exogenously given parameter
of the probability of success function set by
the experimenter.
However, we hypothesize that these two prob-
lems are behaviorally quite different. In the first
case, the second mover is involved in a game
against another person, while in the second case
the second mover plays a game against Nature.
As we argue in Section III, there is substantial
evidence on social comparison effects that moti-
vate our hypothesis.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL COMPARISONS
FOR EFFORT CHOICE
Our hypothesis is that the presence of rivals
and the social comparisons they afford affect
competitive behavior and hence also measure
disappointment aversion. This hypothesis is
based on a substantial literature in economics
and psychology. Starting with the psychology
literature, studies of social facilitation (Zajonc
1965) have long investigated the importance of
the awareness of being evaluated by others and
its influence on performance (e.g., Blascovich
et al. 1999; Markus 1978). In economics, evi-
dence is accumulating that social comparisons
matter for effort choice (see, e.g., Falk and
Ichino 2006; Mas and Moretti 2009; Gächter,
Nosenzo, and Sefton 2013; Thöni and Gächter
2015; Herbst and Mas 2015; Gill et al. 2016).
Observing others also influences risk-taking
behaviors (e.g., Bougheas, Nieboer, and Sefton
2013; Cooper and Rege 2011; Dijk, Holmen, and
Kirchler 2014; Fafchamps, Kebede, and Zizzo
2015; Linde and Sonnemans 2012; Schwerter
2016).
Further support for the potential influence of
social comparisons in competitive settings comes
from the study by Herrmann and Orzen (2008).
They study the role of social preferences in a
sequential rent-seeking contest. They compare
a second-mover’s response to the first-mover’s
investment when the first mover is a human
subject and when the first mover’s investment
is a random number chosen by the computer.
Herrmann and Orzen find second movers make
higher investments when they play against
another person compared with when they play
against the computer. Similarly, Eisenkopf and
Teyssier (2013) examine a simultaneous move
game and find that average investment into a
contest is higher in the presence of rivals.
There are other channels that can also lead
to social comparison effects. More generally,
the presence of the opponent might be behav-
iorally important because it might arouse emo-
tions, such as social disappointment/elation from
payoff comparisons and context-dependent joy of
winning (e.g., Dohmen et al. 2011), in addition to
the pecuniary reward.
To give an example of how social compar-
isons may affect behavior in the context of GP’s
experiment, consider the effect of asymmetric
inequality aversion. Suppose that in a game
against Nature the “material utility” from mone-
tary earnings is u2(y2)= y2, but in a game against
another person the “material utility” from mone-
tary payoffs depends not only on own payoff but
also on the other person’s payoff. Specifically,
suppose the second mover is inequality averse
as in the study by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), so
that “material utility” from monetary payoffs
is u2(y2)= y2 −α2 max {y1 − y2, 0}−β2 max
{y2 − y1, 0}, where α2 and β2 (α2 ≥ β2 , β2 < 1)
are preference parameters measuring the second
mover’s marginal disutility from disadvanta-
geous and advantageous inequality, respectively.2
Now, in the two-person real effort competi-
tion, the monetary payoff to the second mover
is y2 ∈ {0, v}, and so the effective prize spread,
that is, the difference between the material util-
ity of winning the prize and not winning the
prize, is simply v in the game against Nature and
v(1+α2 −β2) in the game against another per-
son. The upshot is that if the second mover is
asymmetrically inequality averse (i.e., α2 > β2)
then the effective prize spread in a contest against
another person is greater than that in a con-
test against Nature. Thus, when winning in a
2. Note, the terminology is different from that usually
used in discussion of the Fehr-Schmidt model. Usually, mate-
rial utility would refer to the utility from own pecuniary
earnings, and in addition the agent gets disutility stemming
from inequality. Here “material utility” includes inequality
aversion.
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competition means earning more than another
person and losing means earning less, asymmet-
ric inequality aversion leads to higher stakes, and
in turn the higher stakes lead to a stronger dis-
couragement effect.
Formally, with this specification of mate-
rial utility the expression for expected utility
(Equation (1)) changes to become
EU2
(
e1, e2
)
= −α2v + v
(
1 + α2 − β2
)
P(2)
+ λ2v
(
1 + α2 − β2
)
P (1 − P) − C2
(
e2
)
,
and with the quadratic cost specification the dis-
couragement effect becomes
de∗2∕de1 = −λ2v
(
1 + α2 − β2
)
∕
(
2γ2c − λ2v
(
1 + α2 − β2
))
< 0.
Thus, with asymmetric inequality aversion,
the discouragement effect is predicted to be
stronger when facing a human opponent, and the
effect is stronger for second movers with higher
values of (1+α2 −β2).
In summary, there are theoretical and empir-
ical arguments why decisions taken in a social
environment (a contest against another person)
might differ from decisions taken in an aso-
cial but otherwise identical environment (a con-
test against Nature). In Section IV, we describe
how our experiment is designed to test this
hypothesis.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
A. Design
Our design compares two treatments,
SOCIAL and ASOCIAL, in three waves of
sessions. In each wave, there were six SOCIAL
and three ASOCIAL sessions, with 20 subjects
participating in each session. Thus, in each
wave 120 subjects participated in our SOCIAL
treatment (60 first movers and 60 second movers,
as in GP) and 60 subjects participated in our
ASOCIAL treatment. Across all three waves,
540 subjects participated in our experiment.
In sessions using our SOCIAL treatment, ten
subjects were designated as first movers and
another ten as second movers. Roles were ran-
domly determined and remained the same for the
whole duration of the session. Each participant
then took part in two practice rounds and ten pay-
ing rounds. A round consisted of a sequential
two-player game between a first mover and a
second mover. First movers were repaired with
second movers at the end of each round following
a “no contagion” matching so that no subject’s
behavior in a given round can directly or indi-
rectly affect the behavior of other participants that
the subject is paired with at a later round. In prac-
tice rounds, each participant was paired with an
automaton so that these experiences would not
contaminate the matching protocol in the pay-
ing rounds.
At the beginning of the game a monetary
prize drawn from {£0.10, £0.20, … , £3.90} is
announced to the players. The first mover then
has 120 seconds to position sliders on a computer
screen (see GP for a more detailed discussion of
the slider task). The number of correctly posi-
tioned sliders is the first mover’s points score, and
is denoted e1. The second mover is then informed
of the value of e1 and has 120 seconds to posi-
tion sliders. The number of sliders correctly posi-
tioned by the second mover is denoted e2. At the
end of the game, one of the players wins the prize
and the other player gets nothing. The second
mover wins with probability (e2 − e1 + 50)/100.
At the end of each round, each participant learned
her own and her pair member’s points score, her
probability of winning the prize, and whether she
was the winner or loser in that round.
The ASOCIAL treatment removes the scope
for interpersonal comparisons by converting this
two-player game into an individual decision-
making task with as few changes as possible. At
the beginning of the game, a prize and a “given
number,” n, is announced. The player then has
120 seconds to position sliders. For convenience,
we refer to this player as the second mover and
her number of correctly positioned sliders as e2
(though of course, there is no first mover). At the
end of the game, the second mover wins the prize
with probability (e2 − n+ 50)/100. We used the
values of e1 and the realized prize values from the
SOCIAL treatment to provide the given numbers
and prizes in the ASOCIAL treatment.
To see the difference between treatments as
experimental participants saw it we reproduce
the slider screen heading seen by second movers
in Figure 1. Panel A presents the information
displayed in the SOCIAL treatment and panel
B shows the information displayed to the sub-
jects (who acted as if they were second movers)
in the ASOCIAL treatment. The key differen-
tial information has been italicized (but not in
the experiment).
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FIGURE 1
Key Differential Information for Second Movers in the Two Treatments: (A) SOCIAL and (B)
ASOCIAL
Key Differential Information for Second Movers in the Two Treatments  
SOCIALA B ASOCIAL
The prize in pounds for this round is: …
The first mover’s points score was: … 
The prize in pounds for  this round is:…
The given number for this round is:… 
Currently, your points score is: … Currently, your points score is: …
Unlike in the SOCIAL treatment where the
second movers knew that the first movers were
real human participants who were participat-
ing in the same session, the participants in the
ASOCIAL treatment were simply told that their
probability of winning depended on their points
score relative to a “given number.” We did not
tell subjects that this number was generated by
the choice of a subject in an earlier session,
as that might have introduced a social element
into the ASOCIAL treatment. All references to
other players were removed from the instructions.
These procedures were adopted so that the second
movers in the SOCIAL treatment and the subjects
in the ASOCIAL treatment dealt with as similar
a decision problem as possible except for the
presence of a rival. Furthermore, in order to keep
subjects’ practical experiences with the slider
task as similar as possible in both treatments,
the participants in the ASOCIAL treatment
were asked to wait 2 minutes before they started
their tasks just as second movers had to wait
2 minutes for their paired first movers to finish
the task before they started their own tasks in the
SOCIAL treatment.
B. Differences between Waves
In the first wave, we used the GP software
to run our SOCIAL sessions.3 However, after
observing that average effort (i.e., correctly posi-
tioned sliders) was systematically lower than in
GP we realized that the visual length of each
slider was slightly shorter than in GP’s experi-
ment because of the smaller screen size of the
computer monitors in the CeDEx lab. This made
the task somewhat more difficult for our sub-
jects. Therefore, in the second wave of ses-
sions we modified the slider screen so that the
3. Available for download at https://www.aeaweb.org/
aer/data/feb2012/20100346_data.zip.
visual length of each slider would be exactly the
same as in GP’s original experiment. The third
wave was the same as the second with three
exceptions. First, instead of allowing the in-built
random number generator to draw the prizes in
the SOCIAL sessions, we used the realized prize
values from GP.4 Second, we only recruited inex-
perienced participants who had taken part in at
most one other experiment. Third, we conducted
all experimental sessions on weekdays at the
same time of the day (14:00–15:30 hours). These
exceptions were made to enhance comparability
with GP.
C. Procedures
At the beginning of each session, experimen-
tal instructions were handed out to participants
in paper form and were read aloud by the
experimenter. For the SOCIAL treatment, we
used exactly the same instructions as in GP.
The instructions for our ASOCIAL treatment
were adapted accordingly. All instructions are
reproduced in Appendix A in Appendix S1,
Supporting Information. Average earnings for
participants were £14.14, including a £4 show-
up fee, for a session lasting about 90 minutes.
All sessions were conducted in the CeDEx
lab at the University of Nottingham using
z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007) and vol-
unteer subjects recruited via ORSEE (Greiner
2015) from the undergraduate student subject
4. Although we used the prize realizations from the GP
experiment we decided to retain the GP instructions. These
stated “In each paying round, there will be a prize which you
may win. Each prize will be chosen randomly at the beginning
of the round and will be between £0.10 and £3.90.” We might
instead have explained that the prize draws were made in
an earlier experiment, but we decided that explaining this to
subjects would be potentially confusing. In either case, the
subjects would learn the outcome of the random draw at the
beginning of the round.
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FIGURE 2
Development of First Mover Effort
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TABLE 1
Random Effects Regressions for First Mover Effort
GP SOCIAL1 SOCIAL2 SOCIAL3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prize 0.670*** (0.153) 0.230** (0.110) 0.243** (0.102) 0.282** (0.126)
Intercept 20.896*** (0.908) 18.284*** (0.588) 22.240*** (0.630) 21.868*** (0.639)
σω 5.401 3.226 3.803 3.262
σϵ 3.873 2.828 2.632 3.202
N × R 600 600 600 600
Hausman test for random
versus fixed effects
χ2(10)= 0.00 χ2(10)= 0.42 χ2(10)= 1.88 χ2(10)= 2.01
p= 1.000 p= 1.000 p= .997 p= .996
Notes: σω denotes the standard deviation of the time invariant individual specific random effects and σϵ denotes the standard
deviation of the time varying idiosyncratic errors, which are i.i.d. over rounds and first movers. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Round dummies (with the first round the omitted category) are included and are jointly significant at the 1% level in all cases.
***p< .01; **p< .05; *p< .10.
pool (excluding those who were then studying
economics or psychology).
V. RESULTS
A. First Mover Effort
There are strong round effects in the data. This
is seen in Figure 2, which shows average first
mover effort by round for each wave (and, for
comparison, in GP).5 In our first wave, first mover
effort was systematically lower than in GP. After
modifying the slider screen for the second and
5. The GP data are available for download at https://www
.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.102.1.469.
third waves, average effort, and the development
of effort across rounds, was much more in line
with GP.
Note that Figure 2 does not condition efforts
on prize values. To do this, we report random
effects regressions, including round dummies to
capture round effects. The results are reported in
Table 1. Our estimates are similar across all three
waves and, as expected, first movers supply more
effort when the prize is higher. Note, however,
that our estimate of the prize effect is somewhat
lower than in GP.
B. Second Mover Effort
Figure 3 shows the development of average
second mover effort over time in each of the
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FIGURE 3
Development of Second Mover Effort in the Three Waves
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three waves.6 For the sake of easy comparison,
we include average GP second mover efforts in
each panel. We find that second mover efforts are
very similar in SOCIAL and ASOCIAL in each
of the three waves. With the exception of the first
wave, average second mover efforts tend to be
somewhat higher in our data than in GP.
Recall that disappointment aversion predicts
that a second mover would respond to higher first
mover effort by decreasing her effort and even
more so when competing for a higher prize. To
test this discouragement effect, we use the same
random effects panel data regression as in GP.
Table 2 reports the estimates for each wave in
SOCIAL and ASOCIAL.
Contrary to GP’s estimates, which are repro-
duced in column (1), the coefficients on the
regressors are generally insignificant: of 6× 3
reported coefficients only two are significantly
different from zero at the 10% level. To test
whether second mover effort is neutral with
respect to first mover effort, we test the joint sig-
nificance of the coefficients on e1 and Prize * e1.
In only one of the six cases, ASOCIAL1, is
there a significant effect at the 10% level, and
6. One participant from the first wave of the ASOCIAL
treatment, one participant from the second wave of the ASO-
CIAL treatment, and one second mover from the third wave
of the SOCIAL treatment are dropped from our data analy-
sis because they appear to have been unable to position any
slider correctly. GP also found one second mover did not posi-
tion any slider correctly in their experimental sample and drop
this participant from their main data analysis. Neither our, nor
their, main findings are affected by the inclusion or exclusion
of these participants.
here the effect differs from GP in that there is
a stronger discouragement effect at lower prize
levels. Thus, we find only very limited evidence
that second mover behavior is influenced by
first mover effort, and we do not find the dis-
couragement effect predicted by disappointment
aversion. Note, however, that we find weak incen-
tive effects in general: we also tested whether
second mover efforts were sensitive to prizes
(i.e., we tested the joint significance of Prize and
Prize * e1) and found a significant effect at the
10% level in only two cases (ASOCIAL1 and
SOCIAL3; see Table 2).
C. Structural Estimation
We also repeated the structural estimation
of disappointment aversion parameters follow-
ing GP, using their preferred specification (GP,
Table 3, p. 487). They assume a second mover’s
expected utility is as given in Equation (1), where
the preference parameter λ2 is assumed to be nor-
mally distributed in the population, with mean λ̃2
and variance σ2λ. The cost function is specified as
C2
(
e2
)
= be2 + c2,n,r e22∕2,
where b is a parameter constant across subjects
and rounds and the convexity parameter, c2 , n , r,
for subject n in round r is given by
c2,n,r = κ + δr + μn + πn,r,
where κ is constant across subjects and rounds, δr
are round fixed effects, and μn are subject random
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effects assumed to be independent draws from
a Weibull distribution with scale parameter φμ
and shape parameter ϕμ. The final term, πn , r, is
a random shock that varies across subjects and
rounds and follows a Weibull distribution with
scale parameter ϕπ and shape parameter φπ.
There are 17 parameters to be estimated:
λ̃2, σ2λ, b, κ,ϕμ, φμ ,ϕπ , and φπ, in addition to the
nine round fixed effects (the first round providing
the omitted category). Estimation is done using
the method of simulated moments (MSM). First,
selected moments of the experimental data are
calculated (see Appendix B in Appendix S1 for
the observed moments). Next, using trial values
of the unknown parameters and the first mover
efforts and prize values from the experimen-
tal data, 30 simulated samples of second mover
efforts are created, each involving ten rounds of
effort choices by 60-second movers. A goodness
of fit metric is then computed based on the dif-
ferences between the average moments across
the simulated samples and the corresponding
moments in the experimental data. This process
is repeated using a simulated annealing method
to search over the parameter space for the MSM
estimates that maximize the goodness of fit.
Our estimates (including a reestimation using
GP data) are reported in Table 3 below.7 Esti-
mates of the cost function are broadly in line
with GP. The estimate of b is significantly neg-
ative and there is significant within-subject and
between-subject variation in the cost of effort
function, with more variation between- than
within-subject. However, our results are quite
different when it comes to the λ2 parameter,
which measures the difference between the
second mover’s marginal utility of earnings in
the loss and the gain domain (where expected
earnings define the reference point). Whereas
the estimate of the mean of the distribution, λ̃2,
is positive and significant in GP, our estimates
are much lower and generally insignificant.
Indeed, in four of the six cases, the estimate is
7. Note, although we used the exact code provided by GP
to create the GP column, the estimates differ slightly from
those reported in their paper due to simulation noise. For
our datasets, we also used the GP code, except that we had
to increase the bounds of the parameter space. For our first
wave the code did not deliver MSM estimates. The reason
is that some of the observed moments are calibrated from
the GP sample (e.g., the proportion of second mover efforts
exceeding 35). In our first wave average efforts, aggregating
over all subjects and rounds, are lower than in GP by about
four sliders, and there are no observations where second
mover efforts exceed 35. In order to calculate estimates using
the GP code and the moments selected by GP, we added four
sliders to each score in the first wave.
negative. In the second wave of ASOCIAL the
negative estimate of λ̃2 is significant. This is
an unexpected finding and taken at face value
it would mean that subjects weight gains more
heavily than losses. We are reluctant to put
much weight on this finding, as it is clear from
Table 3 that the estimates vary considerably
across waves. Moreover, in four of the six cases
the model over-identification test is rejected at
the 10% level.
Building on the observation that asymmet-
ric inequality aversion affects the strength of
the discouragement effect, we also estimated a
richer model in which expected utility is given by
Equation (2), while retaining the same cost func-
tion specification. To estimate the richer model,
we used a subject random effect specification
for the social preference parameter, (1+α2 −β2),
assuming that this follows a Weibull distribu-
tion.8 We fit simulated moments to the same set
of moments as before. The richer model has two
additional parameters corresponding to the scale
and shape parameters of the social preference
parameter distribution. MSM estimates are pre-
sented in Table 4. Rather than report estimates
of the scale and shape parameters of the social
preference parameter distribution, we report the
implied estimates of the mean and standard devi-
ation of this distribution.
For the GP data, we observe significant varia-
tion in social preference parameters, but this has
little effect on the qualitative features of the other
estimates. As with the simpler model, the esti-
mated mean of the distribution of disappointment
aversion parameters is significantly positive, and
there is a significant estimated discouragement
effect at medium and high prize values. Also, in
our data, estimating the richer model does not
have much of an effect on cost function estimates.
However, estimation of the richer model for our
data does not deliver a consistent picture of how
preference parameters affect behavior. The esti-
mates of λ̃2 are insignificant in all cases, and the
estimates of the mean of the distribution of social
preferences are also insignificantly different from
one. Given our earlier evidence that prize effects
are weak in our data, perhaps it is unsurpris-
ing that we fail to observe significant results
from structural estimation of more nuanced prize
8. Note that the richer model essentially allows different
individuals to have different effective prize spreads for a
given prize value. We considered it important to impose a
positive effective prize spread (i.e., ceteris paribus, winning
is preferred to losing) and so used a distribution with non-
negative support for the social preference parameter.
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TABLE 5
Random Effects Regressions for Second Mover Effort (Pooling SOCIAL and ASOCIAL)
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 All waves
(1) (2) (3) (4)
e1 0.023 (0.047) 0.015 (0.046) −0.080 (0.053) −0.022 (0.027)
Prize 0.454 (0.476) 0.231 (0.524) −0.995* (0.582) −0.200 (0.287)
Prize * e1 −0.018 (0.022) −0.004 (0.021) 0.048** (0.022) 0.014 (0.012)
ASOCIAL 2.068 (1.567) 1.642 (1.839) −2.027 (2.060) 0.379 (1.012)
ASOCIAL * e1 −0.124* (0.067) −0.030 (0.066) 0.070 (0.074) −0.015 (0.038)
ASOCIAL * Prize −0.729 (0.673) −0.380 (0.741) 0.789 (0.816) −0.010 (0.406)
ASOCIAL * Prize * e1 0.042 (0.031) 0.016 (0.029) −0.032 (0.032) 0.003 (0.017)
Wave 1 −4.578*** (0.017)
Intercept 18.499*** (1.115) 22.983*** (1.316) 24.527*** (1.476) 23.677*** (0.742)
σω 3.307 4.245 4.147 3.897
σϵ 2.622 2.739 2.971 2.784
H0: no treatment effect χ2(4)= 4.99 χ2(4)= 1.70 χ2(4)= 1.23 χ2(4)= 0.69
p= .288 p= .790 p= .873 p= .953
N × R 1,190 1,190 1,190 3,570
Hausman test for random versus fixed effects — χ2(15)= 0.38 — χ2(15)= 5.29
— p= 1.000 — p= .989
Notes: σω denotes the standard deviation of the time invariant individual specific random effects and σϵ denotes the standard
deviation of the time varying idiosyncratic errors, which are i.i.d. over rounds and second movers. Standard errors are in
parentheses. Round dummies (with the first round the omitted category) are included and are jointly significant at the 1% level in
all cases. The Hausman test statistic is missing in Wave 1 and Wave 3 because the estimated covariance matrix of the difference
between random and fixed effects estimators is not invertible. Subjects who failed to position any sliders correctly in any round
are excluded from the analysis.
***p< .01; **p< .05; *p< .10.
effects, such as asymmetric weighting of gains
and losses relative to expectations and variation
in effective prize spreads across subjects.
D. Treatment Differences
Since our main focus is whether interper-
sonal comparisons affect behavior, we also com-
pared second mover behavior across our SOCIAL
and ASOCIAL treatments. To do this, our first
approach exploits the fact that in our design each
SOCIAL second mover has a counterpart in the
ASOCIAL treatment who had to complete the
same slider task for the same prize and same
monetary incentives. For each SOCIAL second
mover, we take the average number of sliders
positioned across all ten paying rounds, and com-
pare this average to that of their counterpart in the
ASOCIAL treatment, using a Wilcoxon signed-
ranks test. In none of the waves do we observe
a significant treatment effect (first wave p= .497,
second wave p= .280, third wave p= .979).
Second, we reran random effects regressions
of second mover efforts on prizes, e1 and an
interaction term for the pooled SOCIAL +
ASOCIAL samples, adding treatment dummies
and treatment interactions. The results are in
Table 5. In addition, we report the test of the
joint significance of the treatment dummies and
treatment interactions. In none of the three waves
is there a significant treatment effect. We also
find neither a treatment effect nor a significant
influence of e1 and prizes when we pool all waves
(including a dummy variable for the first wave to
capture the level shift caused by modifying the
slider screen; see Section III.A).
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this study, we have tested the hypothesis
that disappointment aversion, and the discour-
agement effect produced by disappointment
aversion, will be different in a competition
against another person and a competition against
Nature. Our experiments reject this hypothesis
for the environment in which we studied this
question—GP’s two-person sequential effort
competition using the slider task as a real effort
performance measurement. We conclude that
social comparison effects do not influence esti-
mates of disappointment aversion. Of course,
this does not necessarily imply that our finding
is generalizable to other environments or real
effort tasks.
An unexpected finding of our experiment is
that, in contrast to GP, we failed to find support
for disappointment aversion in any wave of any
treatment. Despite this being a “null result” it
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is nevertheless important to report. Our results,
taken together with GP, provide mixed evidence
on models of expectation-based reference depen-
dence (e.g., Ko˝szegi and Rabin 2007). These
models assume individuals evaluate gains and
losses asymmetrically around a reference point,
where the reference point is expectations-based
and depends on the choice made. The assumption
that individuals, in making a choice, take into
account that the choice will affect the reference
point about which gains and losses are evaluated
seems quite sophisticated, but whether actual
behavior reflects such behavioral assumptions
is an empirical question. Whereas GP find sup-
port, this is not echoed in our study. Similarly,
Abeler et al. (2011) and Ericson and Fuster
(2011) find choices consistent with endogenous
expectations-based reference points, whereas
Holzmeister et al. (2015) and Altmejd et al.
(2015) who replicated Abeler et al. (2011) and
Ericson and Fuster (2011), respectively, find
no or only weakly significant support. Gneezy
et al. (2017) also replicated the Abeler et al.
(2011) design, although in additional treat-
ments they found important deviations from
expectations-based reference dependence.
Another unexpected finding of our study was
that in all three of our waves we observed much
weaker first mover prize effects than GP, and,
contrary to GP, almost no second mover prize
effects. These weaker prize effects may explain
the absence of discouragement effects. If second
movers are not responsive to monetary prizes,
either because they place little value on the prize
or because their marginal cost of effort is too
high then it is perhaps not surprising that they
are unresponsive to first mover efforts. It is worth
noting, however, that our observed means and
dynamics in effort over time are very similar to
GP; if subjects have a positive marginal cost of
effort and place no value on the prize they should
not be positioning sliders at all. Our result of a
weak or no prize effect is consistent with Araujo
et al. (2016) who perform a between-subject
comparison of slider task performance varying
incentives and find only weak incentive effects.
There are, however, other studies that do find
that slider positioning efforts respond positively
and significantly to increases in financial incen-
tives (e.g., Abeler and Jäger 2015; Lee 2015;
Neckermann, Warnke, and Bradler 2014). Note
that nonmonotonic responses to changes in piece
rates are observed in between-subject studies of
other real-effort tasks (e.g., Ariely et al. 2009;
Gneezy and Rustichini 2000).
In conclusion, we believe our paper makes
two contributions to the literature. First, we have
shown that social comparison effects do not
matter in the contest we studied. Second, our
study contributes to recent replication efforts in
the experimental economics literature (Camerer
et al. 2016)9 to establish a body of knowledge
about results that are robust to replication. In par-
ticular, we show that in the contest we study,
reference-point effects are surprisingly weak.
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